Abstract

In recent years, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has gained more and more popularity as an application of the Internet technology. For various IP applications including VoIP, the topic of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) has attracted major concern from researchers. SIP is an advanced signaling protocol operating on Internet Telephony. SIP uses digest authentication protocols such as Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) and HyperText Transport Protocol (HTTP). When a user seeks SIP services, authentication plays an important role in providing secure access to the server only to the authorized access seekers. Being an insecure-channel-based protocol, a SIP authentication protocol is susceptible to adversarial threats. Therefore, security is a big concern in SIP authentication mechanisms. This paper reveals the security vulnerabilities of two recently proposed SIP authentication schemes for VoIP, Irshad et al.’s scheme [Multimed. Tools. Appl. doi:10.1007/s11042-013- 1807-z] and Arshad and Nikooghadam’s scheme [Multimed. Tools. Appl. DOI 10.1007/ s11042-014-2282-x], the later scheme is based on the former scheme. Irshad et al.’s scheme suffers from password guessing, user impersonation and server spoofing attacks. Arshad and Nikooghadam’s scheme can be threatened with server spoofing and stolen verifier attack. None of these two schemes achieve mutual authentication. It also fails to follow the single round-trip authentication design of Irshad et al.’s scheme. To overcome these weaknesses, we propose a provable secure single round-trip SIP authentication scheme for VoIP using smart card. We formally prove the security of the scheme in random oracle and demonstrate through discussion its resistance to various attacks. The comparative analysis shows that the proposed SIP authentication scheme offers superior performance with a little extra computational cost.

Abstract

Recently, in 2014, He and Wang proposed a robust and efficient multi-server authentication scheme using biometrics-based smart card and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In this paper, we first analyze He-Wang's scheme and show that their scheme is vulnerable to a known session-specific temporary information attack and impersonation attack. In addition, we show that their scheme does not provide strong user's anonymity. Furthermore, He-Wang's scheme cannot provide the user revocation facility when the smart card is lost/stolen or user's authentication parameter is revealed. Apart from these, He-Wang's scheme has some design flaws, such as wrong password login and its consequences, and wrong password update during password change phase. We then propose a new secure multi-server authentication protocol using biometric-based smart card and ECC with more security functionalities. Using the Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic, we show that our scheme provides secure authentication. In addition, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely accepted and used automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications tool, and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks. Our scheme provides high security along with low communication cost, computational cost, and variety of security features. As a result, our scheme is very suitable for battery-limited mobile devices as compared with He-Wang's scheme.

Abstract

Traditional association rule mining based on the support–confidence framework provides the objective measure of the rules that are of interest to users. However, it does not reflect the semantic measure among the items. The semantic measure of an itemset is characterized with utility values that are typically associated with transaction items, where a user will be interested to an itemset only if it satisfies a given utility constraint. In this paper, we first define the problem of finding association rules using utility-confidence framework, which is a generalization of the amount-confidence measure. Using this semantic concept of rules, we then propose a compressed representation for association rules having minimal antecedent and maximal consequent. This representation is generated with the help of high utility closed itemsets (HUCI) and their generators. We propose the algorithms to generate the utility based non-redundant association rules and methods for reconstructing all association rules. Furthermore, we describe the algorithms which generate high utility itemsets (HUI) and high utility closed itemsets with their generators. These proposed algorithms are implemented using both synthetic and real datasets. The results demonstrate better efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed HUCI-Miner algorithm compared to other well-known existing algorithms. In addition, the experimental results show better quality in the compressed representation of the entire rule set under the considered framework.

Abstract

Association rule mining among itemsets is a fundamental task and is of great importance in many data mining applications including attacks in network data, stock market, financial applications, bioinformatics to find genetic disorders, etc. However, association rule extraction from a reasonable-sized database produces a large number of rules. As a result, many of them are redundant to other rules, and they are practically useless. To overcome this issue, methods for mining non-redundant rules are essentially required. To address such problem, we initially propose a definition for redundancy in sense of minimal knowledge and then a compact representation of non-redundant association rules which we call as compact informative generic basis. We also provide an improved version of the existing DCI_CLOSED algorithm (DCI_PLUS) to find out the frequent closed itemsets (FCI) with their minimal representative generators in combination with BitTable which represents a compact database form in a single scan of the original database. We further introduce an algorithm for constructing the compact informative generic basis from the FCI and their generators in an efficient way. We finally present an inference mechanism in which all association rules can be generated without accessing the database. Experiments are performed on the proposed method. The experimental results show that the proposed method outperforms the other existing related methods.

Abstract

Recently, Awasthi and Srivastava proposed a novel biometric remote user authentication scheme for the telecare medicine information system (TMIS) with nonce. Their scheme is very efficient as it is based on efficient chaotic one-way hash function and bitwise XOR operations. In this paper, we first analyze Awasthi-Srivastava’s scheme and then show that their scheme has several drawbacks: (1) incorrect password change phase, (2) fails to preserve user anonymity property, (3) fails to establish a secret session key beween a legal user and the server, (4) fails to protect strong replay attack, and (5) lacks rigorous formal security analysis. We then a propose a novel and secure biometric-based remote user authentication scheme in order to withstand the security flaw found in Awasthi-Srivastava’s scheme and enhance the features required for an idle user authentication scheme. Through the rigorous informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against possible known attacks. In addition, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks, including the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Our scheme is also efficient as compared to Awasthi-Srivastava’s scheme.

Abstract

With the rapid growth of the Internet, a lot of electronic patient records (EPRs) have been developed for e-medicine systems. The security and privacy issues of EPRs are important for the patients in order to understand how the hospitals control the use of their personal information, such as name, address, e-mail, medical records, etc. of a particular patient. Recently, Lee et al. proposed a simple group password-based authenticated key agreement protocol for the integrated EPR information system (SGPAKE). However, in this paper, we show that Lee et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the off-line weak password guessing attack and as a result, their scheme does not provide users’ privacy. To withstand this security weakness found in Lee et al.’s scheme, we aim to propose an effective dynamic group password-based authenticated key exchange scheme for the integrated EPR information system, which retains the original merits of Lee et al.’s scheme. Through the informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme provides users’ privacy, perfect forward security and known-key security, and also protects online and offline password guessing attacks. Furthermore, our scheme efficiently supports the dynamic group password-based authenticated key agreement for the integrated EPR information system. In addition, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks.

Abstract

Advancement in communication technology provides a scalable platform for various services, where a remote user can access the server from anywhere without moving from its place. It provides a unique opportunity for online services such that a user does not need to be physically present at the service center. These services adopt authentication and key agreement protocols in order to ensure authorized and secure access to the resources. Most of the authentication schemes proposed in the literature support a single-server environment, where the user has to register with each server. If a user wishes to access multiple application servers, he/she requires to register with each server. The multi-server authentication introduces a scalable platform such that a user can interact with any server using single registration. Recently, Chuang and Chen proposed an efficient multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme based on a user’s password and biometrics (Chuang and Chen, 2014). Their scheme is a lightweight, which requires the computation of only hash functions. In this paper, we first analyze Chuang and Chen’s scheme and then identify that their scheme does not resist stolen smart card attack which causes the user’s impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. We also show that their scheme fails to protect denial-of-service attack. We aim to propose an efficient improvement on Chuang and Chen’s scheme to overcome the weaknesses of their scheme, while also retaining the original merits of their scheme. Through the rigorous informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against various known attacks including the attacks found in Chuang and Chen’s scheme. Furthermore, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is secure against the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, our scheme is comparable in terms of the communication and computational overheads with Chuang and Chen’s scheme and other related existing schemes.

Abstract

A user authentication in the distributed computer networks (DCNs) plays a crucial rule to verify whether the user is a legal user and can therefore be granted access to the requested services to that user. In recent years, several RSA‐based single sign‐on mechanisms have been proposed in DCNs. However, most of them cannot preserve the user anonymity when possible attacks occur. The user devices are usually battery limited (e.g., cellular phones) and the elliptic‐curve cryptosystem is much efficient than RSA cryptosystem for the battery‐limited devices. In this paper, we aim to propose a new secure elliptic‐curve cryptosystem‐based single sign‐on mechanism for user authentication and key establishment for the secure communications in a DCNs using biometric‐based smart card. In our scheme, a user only needs to remember a private password and his or her selected unique identity to authenticate and agree on a high‐entropy cryptographic one‐time session key with a provider to communicate over untrusted public networks. Through formal and informal security analysis, we show that our scheme prevents other known possible attacks. In addition, we perform simulation on our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely‐accepted Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications tool. The simulation results ensure that our scheme is secure against replay and man‐in‐the‐middle attacks. Furthermore, our scheme provides high security along with lower computational cost and communication cost, and as a result, our scheme is much suitable for the battery‐limited devices as compared to other related RSA‐based schemes.

Abstract

Authentication plays an important role in an open network environment in order to authenticate two communication parties among each other. Authentication protocols should protect the sensitive information against a malicious adversary by providing a variety of services, such as authentication, user credentials’ privacy, user revocation and re-registration, when the smart card is lost/stolen or the private key of a user or a server is revealed. Unfortunately, most of the existing multi-server authentication schemes proposed in the literature do not support the fundamental security property such as the revocation and re-registration with same identity. Recently, in 2014, He and Wang proposed a robust and efficient multi-server authentication scheme using biometrics-based smart card and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In this paper, we analyze the He-Wang’s scheme and show that He-Wang’s scheme is vulnerable to a known session-specific temporary information attack and impersonation attack. In addition, we show that their scheme does not provide strong user’s anonymity. Furthermore, He-Wang’s scheme cannot support the revocation and re-registration property. Apart from these, He-Wang’s scheme has some design flaws, such as wrong password login and its consequences, and wrong password update during password change phase.

Abstract

In 2013, Althobaiti et al. proposed an efficient biometricbased user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks. We analyze their scheme for the security against known attacks. Though their scheme is efficient in computation, in this paper we show that their scheme has some security pitfalls such as (1) it is not resilient against node capture attack,(2) it is insecure against impersonation attack and (3) it is insecure against man-in-the-middle attack. Finally, we give some pointers for improving their scheme so that the designed scheme needs to be secure against various known attacks.