Abstract
A smart grid is an efficient and sustainable energy system that integrates diverse generation entities,distributed storage capacity, and smart appliances and buildings. Smart grids also indirectly facilitate end-user involvement in grid stability. The brokers, supplying electricity to end-users, represent large population of customers in the electricity markets, and incentivization of such brokers to reduce their supply-demand imbalance can lead to utilization of sustainable but intermittent sources of energy like
solar and wind energy. Overall, this will reduce grid operationalization costs by reducing peak demand,
and reduce broker costs, and in-turn reduce energy costs for the end-users. Most of the electricity markets consist of Periodic Double Auctions (PDAs), where trillions of dollars worth electricity is traded. Any broker participating in these PDAs has to plan for bids in the current auction as well as for the future auctions, which highlights the necessity of good bidding strategies. Since the complexity and dimensionality of the actions taken by such brokers is huge, it opens avenues for deployment of autonomous
energy brokers. Smart grids also bring new kind of participants in the energy markets, whose effect on the grid can only be determined through high fidelity simulations. Power TAC offers one such simulation platform using real-world weather data and complex state-of-the-art customer models. In Power TAC, autonomous energy brokers compete to make profits across tariff, wholesale and balancing markets while maintaining the stability of the grid. We make the following contributions to the areas of smart grid, autonomous agents, game theory and machine learning applications: (1) We do a Nash Equilibrium analysis of single unit single-shot double auctions with a certain clearing price and payment rule, which we refer to as ACPR, and find it
intractable to analyze as number of participating agents increase. We further derive the best response for a bidder with complete information in a double auction with ACPR. (2) Leveraging the theory developed for single-shot double auction, we proceed by modeling the PDA of Power TAC wholesale market
as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), and solve it using dynamic programming. Based on that, we propose a novel bidding strategy, namely MDPLCPBS. We empirically show that MDPLCPBS follows
the equilibrium strategy for double auctions that we previously analyze. In addition, we benchmark our strategy against the baseline and the state-of-the art bidding strategies for the Power TAC wholesale market PDAs, and show that MDPLCPBS outperforms most of them consistently. (3) We design a
electricity usage predictor, which uses customer usage patterns and weather data, using neural networks. This is the first usage predictor which utilizes weather data in the Power TAC scenario. (4) We use an MDP based formulation for the tariff market, and solve it using Q-learning to generate tariffs. The novelty lies in defining the reward functions for the MDP, solving the MDP, and the transformation of the solution into a tariff in the tariff market. We also propose a few heuristics which convert nearoptimal
fixed tariffs to time-of-use tariffs aimed at mitigating transmission capacity fees. (5) We discuss the architecture of our autonomous energy broker VidyutVanika, which was the runner-up in Power
TAC 2018 Finals. VidyutVanika implements our learning strategies for the tariff and wholesale market, along with a few heuristic ideas. We have also released VidyutVanika’s binary for offline testing and
research purposes. (6) We do an empirical analysis of VidyutVanika’s performance during Power TAC 2018 Finals, using Power TAC 2018 tournament data. We also illustrate the efficacy of its sub-modules and strategies using controlled experiments.